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SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY VS. EXECUTION OF
JUDGMENT: A NEED TO REAPPRAISE OUR
NATIONAL POLICY
In the United States the doctrine of sovereign immunity has
often frustrated the legitimate expectations of private litigants en-
gaged in disputes with foreign governments and has created a re-
curring problem for American courts. In such disputes, the courts
are disposed to follow the determinations of the State Department
regarding the extent of immunity to be accorded foreign govern-
ments.' Since the State Department distinguishes between the im-
munity of foreign governments from jurisdiction and the immunity
of their property from execution to satisfy adverse judgments, foreign
sovereigns are often immune from execution of judgments even where
immunity from suit has been denied.' Thus, application of the doc-
trine of sovereign immunity often precludes the right of a litigant
to recover against a foreign government and renders the judicial de-
cree a nullity. Further, the ever-increasing governmental control of
commercial activity throughout the nations of the world will mean an
increase in the number of clashes between the litigant's right to full
adjudication of his claim and the foreign sovereign's right to immunity.
This comment will examine the development of the concept of
the inviolability of foreign sovereigns and the interrelationship of the
Executive and Judicial branches of our government in this area. The
permissive trend of courts that allow attachment in aid of jurisdiction
will then be examined in light of continuing judicial reluctance to
sanction the execution of judgments secured against foreign sover-
eigns. Finally, the implications of eventual American trade with
China will be discussed in light of the sovereign immunity-execution
of judgment problem. The comment concludes that a reappraisal of
our national policy in this unsettled area is urgently needed.
L THE BACKGROUND: ABSOLUTE VS. RESTRICTED IMMUNITY
While the principle of sovereign inviolability is well settled in
this country, its limits have never been adequately defined by the
courts. The landmark case of The Schooner Exchange v. M'Faddon 8
1 "The Executive and Judiciary seem to agree on the policy that questions of im-
munity arising in actions commenced by a private individual and involving the property
of a friendly foreign Government should be adjusted rather through the diplomatic
channel than by the compulsion of judicial process." Lyons, The Conclusiveness of the
"Suggestion" and Certification of the American State Department, 24 Brit. Y.B. Int'I L.
116, 146 (1947) [hereinafter Lyons].
2 This State Department position is clearly stated in a letter from the Secretary of
State to the Attorney General of the United States, June 22, 1959, reprinted in Stephen
v. Zivnostenska Banka, Nat'l Corp., 15 App. Div. 2d 111, 116, 222 N.Y.S.2d 128, 134
(1961). Cf. 45 Dep't State Bull. 275, 278 (1961); Weilamann v. Chase Manhattan Bank,
21 Misc. 2d 1086, 192 N.Y.S.2d 469 (Sup. Ct. 1959).
8 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116 (1812).
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serves as the judicial touchstone for the doctrine of sovereign immu-
nity. In that case, United States citizens brought an action against
an armed vessel of the French navy. Plaintiffs alleged that they were
the true owners of the ship and that it had been illegally confiscated
by the defendant and converted to an armed vessel. However, the
Court held that, since the ship was claimed and possessed by the
French government as a war vessel at the time of arrest, the vessel
was immune from the jurisdiction of the Court. Speaking for a unani-
mous Court, Chief Justice Marshall articulated the principle:
The world being composed of distinct sovereignties, possess-
ing equal rights and equal independence, whose mutual
benefit is promoted by intercourse with each other, and by
an interchange of those good offices which humanity dic-
tates and its want requires, all sovereigns have consented to
a relaxation, in practice, in cases under certain peculiar cir-
cumstances, of that absolute and complete jurisdiction within
their respective territories which sovereignty confers.'
In Berizzi Brothers Co. v. Steamship Pesaro, 5 the Court extended
the rule of The Schooner Exchange to include merchant ships of the
foreign sovereign. In Pesaro a libel in rem was brought against a
merchant ship owned and operated by the Italian government for
trade purposes. The plaintiff claimed damages as a result of the de-
fendant's failure to deliver certain goods. Although the ship had not
been part of the Italian naval or military force at the time of arrest,
the Court sustained the defendant's claim of immunity since the ves-
sel was controlled and possessed by Italy. Justice Van Devanter,
speaking for the majority, stated that:
We think the principles [of sovereign immunity] are appli-
cable alike to all ships held and used by a government for
a public purpose, and that when, for the purpose of ad-
vancing the trade of its people or providing revenue for its
treasury, a government acquires, mans and operates ships in
the carrying of trade, they are public ships in the same
sense that war ships are.'
The Pesaro decision represents the "absolutist" approach to sover-
eign immunity, wherein "a sovereign cannot, without his consent, be
made respondent in the courts of another sovereign." 7
Although The Schooner Exchange did not involve the commer-
cial dealings of a foreign government, the Court in Pesaro did not
hesitate to extend the sovereign's protection to that class of activity.
4
 Id. at 135.
5 271 U.S. 562 (1926).
8
 Id. at 574.
7 6 Digest of International Law 553 (Department of State publication, M. White-
man ed. 1968).
370
SOVEREIGN' IMMUNITY VS:. EXECUTION OF 'JUDGMENT.
The Court reasoned that the decision in The Schooner Exchange was
not necessarily restricted to war ships since, at the time of its writing,
merchant ships were operated only by private owners and the pros-
pect of governments engaging in such activity bad not been contem-
plated. 8
 However, dicta in The Schooner Exchange clearly suggests
the contrary:
Without indicating any opinion on this question, it may
safely be affirmed that there is a manifest distinction be-
tween the private property of the person who happens to be
a prince, and that military force which supports the sover-
eign power, and maintains the dignity and independence of
a nation. A prince, by acquiring private property in a for-
eign country, may possibly be considered as subjecting that
property to the territorial jurisdiction; he may be considered
as so far laying down the prince, and assuming the character
of a private individual; but this he cannot be presumed to
do with respect to any portion of that armed force, which
upholds his crown, and the nation he is entrusted to govern.°
Ignoring this reasoning, the Pesaro Court saw no basis for placing
twentieth century governmental commercial activity into a category
separate from the traditionally privileged types of sovereign activity.
After Pesaro, however, some courts began to adopt a restrictive
theory of sovereign inviolability, whereby immunity was accorded to
a sovereign's traditional governmental acts, but not to its private or
commercial activities. In Hannes v. Kingdom of Roumania Monop-
olies Institute,''' plaintiff attached monies owned and deposited by
defendant in New York banks. Finding that the defendant was an
autonomous corporate entity, wholly owned and controlled by Rou-
mania, and formed to exploit certain monopolies and engage in inter-
national loans, the Hannes court denied the defendant's claim of
immunity and defined the restrictive classification:
The development of the practice of states undertaking com-
mercial activities has led to a distinction in considering the
question of immunity between acts of a private nature said
to be jure gestionis as contrasted with acts of a public nature
which are jure imperii. 11
However, it was not until 1952 that the most dramatic reversal
of the Pesaro doctrine occurred, when the Executive branch, not the
Judiciary, formally departed from the absolutist theory of sovereign
immunity. In a letter addressed to the Acting Attorney General of
the United States—popularly known as the Tate Letter—the State
Department announced its policy of adhering to the "restrictive
8 271 U.S. at 573.
11 U.S. (7 Cranch) at 145.
111
 260 App. Div. 189, N.Y.S.2d 825 (1940).
11
 Id. at 196-97, 20 N.Y.S.2d at 833.
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theory" of sovereign immunity." The change in policy was prompted
by the inconsistency which the State Department saw in granting
immunity to foreign governments in our courts while the United
States government subjected itself to suit in these same courts as
well as those of foreign jurisdictions. Further, the State Department
determined that increasing governmental intrusion into commercial
activities necessitated recognition of the rights of private persons
doing business with foreign sovereigns. For these reasons, the Tate
Letter was issued with the intent of abating the continued application
of the absolutist theory.
The State Department believed that the Tate Letter was the
most effective means of assuring judicial application of the restrictive
theory of sovereign immunity since the Department "felt that the
courts are less likely to allow a plea of sovereign immunity where the
executive has declined to do so." Prior to the issuance of the Tate
Letter, the Supreme Court had established the practice of deferring
to pronouncements of the Executive on matters of sovereign immu-
nity. In Republic of Mexico v. Hoffman," a libel was instituted
against a Mexican vessel for damages arising out of a collision. Since
the Mexican government owned the vessel, which was operated by a
privately owned and operated Mexican corporation, the Mexican
Ambassador filed a claim of sovereign immunity. The Court held that
mere government title in the ship, without governmental possession,
was not sufficient to entitle the vessel to immunity. The Court rested
its decision on the fact that the State Department had chosen not to
suggest that the vessel was immune from suit, even though there had
been ample opportunity to do so:
We can only conclude that it is the national policy not to
extend the immunity in the manner now suggested, and that
it is the duty of the courts, in a matter so intimately asso-
ciated with our foreign policy and which may profoundly
affect it, not to enlarge an immunity to an extent which the
government, although often asked, has not seen fit to recog-
nize ... .15
Notwithstanding an admission in the Tate Letter that the shift
in policy from the "absolutist" to the "restrictive" theory of sover-
eign immunity "by the executive cannot control the courts,' the
Supreme Court continues to acknowledge the propriety of State De-
partment determinations of sovereign immunity "to avoid adju-
12
 The Tate Letter, from Jack B. Tate, the Acting Legal Advisor of the United
States Department of State, to Philip B. Perlman, the Acting United States Attorney
General, reprinted in 6 Digest of International Law, supra note 7, at 569-71.
13 Id. at 571.
14 324 U.S. 30 (1945).
13 Id. at 38.
16 6 Digest of International Law, supra note 7, at 571.
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dications which might affront the dignity of a sovereign and thus
embarrass the executive." In National City Bank of New York v.
Republic of China, 18
 an action was instituted by the Republic of
China for the payment of monies deposited by an agency of that
government with the National City Bank. The bank counterclaimed
and sought an affirmative judgment on defaulted Treasury Notes of
China owned by the bank. Despite the Republic of China's claim of
immunity, the Supreme Court permitted the counterclaim and, noting
the State Department's silence, stated that "the State Department is
the normal means of suggesting to the courts that a sovereign be
granted immunity from a particular suit. Its failure or refusal to
suggest such immunity has been accorded significant weight by this
Court."" Commenting specifically on the restrictive theory pro-
nouncement of the Tate Letter, the Court in National City Bank
stated that the State Department correspondence represented a broad
denial of immunity for the commercial activities of foreign sover-
eigns, notwithstanding the rejection of such a distinction in Pesaro. 2°
Thus, while the Supreme Court did not specifically overrule Pesaro,
it effectively vitiated the reasoning of that decision by following the
Executive's policy determination in the Tate correspondence.
Lower courts have also shown a readiness to adopt and apply
the restrictive theory of sovereign immunity. In Chemical Natural
Resources, Inc. v. Republic of Venezuela," the foreign sovereign was
sued in assumpsit. Plaintiff attached a merchant ship, allegedly owned
by the Republic, to gain jurisdiction over the sovereign, whereupon a
"suggestion of immunity" was filed by the State Department. In up-
holding the claim of immunity, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court
adopted the United States Supreme Court's regard for State Depart-
ment pronouncements in this area. The court also noted that the Tate
Letter stated "in clear and unmistakable language that the Depart-
ment has abandoned its long established principle of absolute govern-
mental immunity." 22 Thus, courts now look upon the restrictive
approach embodied in the Tate Letter as the authoritative guide in
sovereign immunity cases." Without having been reversed in fact, the
absolutist approach of Pesaro has been effectively abandoned by the
courts for reliance upon a policy position of the State Department
in which foreign sovereigns are no longer immune from the jurisdic-
tion of American courts in every situation.
17 Lyons, supra note 1, at 146.
18 348 U.S. 356 (1955).
19 Id. at 360.
20 Id. at 361.
21 420 Pa. 134, 215 A.2d 864 (1966).
22 Id. at 159, 215 Aid at 875.
28 Cf., National Institute of Agrarian Reform v. Dekle, 137 So. 2d 581 (Fla. 1962);
Republic of Cuba v. Dixie Paint and Varnish Co., 104 Ga. App. 854, 123 S.E.2d 198
(1961).
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II. INCONSISTENCY IN THE STATE DEPARTMENT POLICY
Although the Tate Letter indicated that protection of the rights
of private persons doing business with foreign governments was a
major concern of the State Department, existing Department policies
continue to frustrate such protection. This problem is caused by the
distinction drawn by the State Department between immunity of a
foreign sovereign from jurisdiction and immunity of its property from
execution:
The Department is of the further view that, where under
international law a foreign government is not immune from
suit, attachment of its property for the purpose of obtaining
jurisdiction is not prohibited. In many cases jurisdiction
could probably not be obtained otherwise. But property so
attached to obtain jurisdiction over the defendant govern-
ment cannot be retained to satisfy a judgment ensuing from
the suit because in accordance with international law the
property of a foreign sovereign is immune from execution
even in a case where the foreign sovereign is not immune
from suit."
Thus, a judgment secured against a foreign sovereign provides empty
relief for the private litigant in such disputes and renders the judicial
decree devoid of any real force or effect. Furthermore, the "juris-
diction-execution" distinction is inconsistent with the Tate Letter
purpose of protecting the rights of private persons doing business
with foreign governments since it enables sovereigns to avoid respon-
sibility for their commercial obligations.
Nevertheless, the State Department's view has been accepted by
the courts. In Three Stars Trading Co. v. Republic of Cuba, 25 plain-
tiff was allowed to attach debts owed to Cuba by persons in the
United States. The court reasoned that since the foreign government
is permitted to make money through commercial activities in the
United States, it should be required to respond in our courts to dis-
putes arising from those commercial contracts. However, the court
noted that Cuba could successfully claim immunity from execution
by "appropriate subsequent proceedings."" In Flota Maritima
Browning de Cuba v. Motor Vessel De La Habana," a libel was
brought against a vessel in 1959. In 1960, the Republic of Cuba en-
tered the case claiming ownership of the ship and, in 1962, the Re-
public claimed immunity with respect to the seized vessel. The court
24 Stephen v. Zivnostenska Banks, Nat'l Corp., 15 App. Div. 2d 11, 116, 222 N.Y.S.
2d 128, 134 (1961) (emphasis added).
25
 32 Misc. 2d 4, 222 N.Y.S.2d 675 (Sup. Ct. 1961).
20
 Id. at 6, 222 N.Y.S.2d at 678. The court was referring to the sovereign's request
for a "suggestion" of immunity from the State Department in any subsequent action
brought by the plaintiff to enforce execution of the judgment against the sovereign.
27 218 F. Supp. 938 (D. Md. 1963).
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found an implied waiver of immunity by Cuba since the plea had not
been timely or properly made. However, the court also stated that:
[Al foreign state should be allowed to reserve its claim of
execution immunity while waiving jurisdictional immunity
and joining issue on the merits. It ought not to be under
any obligation to reserve in any way its right to assert im-
munity of its unrelated, unarrested property from execution
when it appears generally and waives its jurisdictional im-
munity.28
These cases indicate that, notwithstanding possible inequities to pri-
vate litigants in actions involving the property of a foreign sovereign,
the issue of "immunity from execution" should be determined through
diplomatic channels rather than through judicial proceedings.
The inconsistency of a policy distinguishing between "immunity
from jurisdiction" and "immunity from execution" is highlighted by
the fact that, in most cases where immunity from suit is denied, juris-
diction over the foreign government can be obtained only by attach-
ment of the sovereign's property. In Purdy Co. v. Argentina,29 an
action on a contract for the sale and delivery of goods was brought
against Argentina and the department which owns and operates the
steel industry of that country. Service of process was made on the
Argentine Consul in Chicago. The court held that service on the
consul was insufficient to establish in personam jurisdiction over the
sovereign since he "was not by law or specific appointment the agent
. . . for service of process.' However, the court indicated that the
doctrine of restrictive immunity could "otherwise have full recog-
nition and application"81 in this case if the plaintiff obtained quasi
in rem jurisdiction by attaching property of the sovereign.
Ambassadors have similarly been held not subject to service of
process. In Hellenic Lines, Ltd. v. Moore," a libel was filed in per-
sonam against the Republic of Tunisia. A summons in this suit was
addressed to the Tunisian Ambassador in the United States. When
the defendant, a United States Marshal, declined to deliver the sum-
mons on grounds of diplomatic immunity, the plaintiff brought a
mandamus action to compel service. In dismissing the action, the
court relied upon a "suggestion" by the State Department that such
service "would prejudice the United States' foreign relations and
would probably impair the performance of diplomatic functions.""
It should be noted that not all attempts to gain in personam
jurisdiction will fail. In fact, a recent federal court decision denied
28
 Id. at 944.
20 333 F.2d 9S (7th Cir. 1964).
80
 Id. at 97.
81
 Id.
32 345 F.2d 978 (D.C. Cir. 1965).
88
 Id. at 980.
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in rem jurisdiction where it was possible to gain in personam juris-
diction. In Prelude Corp. v. F/V Atlantik, 84
 the United States Dis-
trict Court for the Northern District of California denied the
attachment of a Soviet freighter which had been seized in order to
gain jurisdiction. The plaintiff, a Massachusetts corporation engaged
in lobster fishing, sought to recover damages from the U.S.S.R. for
alleged interference with the plaintiff's fishing activities off the At-
lantic Coast. In an attempt to gain jurisdiction over the U.S.S.R., the
plaintiff attached the Soviet ship Suleyman Stalskiy in San Fran-
cisco. However, the court denied attachment on the presentation of
the U.S.S.R. that the owner of the attached freighter, the Far East
Steamship Corporation (FESCO), was a juridical entity sufficiently
independent from the government under Soviet law to bear respon-
sibility for its obligations. The court further based its ruling on the
fact that, even if FESCO were a direct instrumentality of the Soviet
government, Soviet agents or representatives were available for ser-
vice of process, thereby precluding attachment as a means of gaining
jurisdiction. In Victory Transport, Inc. v. Comisaria General," ser-
vice of a petition to arbitrate, pursuant to Section 4 of the United
States Arbitration Act," was made by mail to a branch of the Spanish
Ministry of Commerce. The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
found that there was in personam jurisdiction based upon the parties'
consent to arbitrate in New York. Nevertheless, the court recognized
that while there is no bar to in personam jurisdiction over a foreign
sovereign, "in most cases jurisdiction . . . is obtained in an in rem
proceeding."'"
Although the "immunity from execution" of a foreign sovereign's
property is recognized by the State Department and followed by most
courts, it has not been granted in every case. In Stephen v. Zivno-
stenska Banka, Nat'l Corp.," a suit was brought in New York to
recover sums of money deposited in a nationalized bank of the Re-
public of Czechoslovakia. Despite a "suggestion of immunity" filed
by the State Department, the court affirmed a lower court order re-
straining various American banks from transferring property of the
defendant. The court reasoned that the suggestion did not "assume
to determine disputed issues of title"" regarding the property since
such a determination "necessarily involves the legal effect and impli-
cations of the final judgment herein . . . . The suggestion of immunity
from execution of the property of the Republic of Czechoslovakia
does not avail the defendant and has no application to its property." 4°
34 Civil No. C-71 1123 (N.D. Calif., June 15, 1971).
Se 336 F.2d 354 (2d Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 381 U.S. 934 (1965).
Be 9 U.S.C. 4 (1970).
87 336 F.2d at 363.
88 15 App. Div. 2d 111, 222 N.Y.S.2d 128 (1961).
29 Id. at 119, 222 N.Y.S.2d at 137.
4° Id. at 120, 222 N.Y.S.2d at 137-38.
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In National City Bank of New York v. Republic of China, 41
where the court permitted a counterclaim against the Republic of
China on a matter unrelated to the original action, the defendant-
bank was permitted to setoff its claim against that of the sovereign.
The court felt that implicit in the concept of sovereign immunity is
the notion "that considerations of fair play must be taken into ac-
count in its application." 42 However, National City Bank cannot be
construed as a sweeping attack on the "jurisdiction-execution" incon-
sistency, since the "fair play" consideration was narrowly applied to
the facts of the case. The court reasoned that it would be unfair to
allow the Republic of China to avail itself of the benefit of bringing
suit in an American court, only to deny the right of counterclaim to
the defendant in the same action. Further, the court limited the de-
fendant's recovery to a setoff against the sovereign's claim. The
Stephen decision is similarly narrow since the court was concerned
with the issue of title to property and rejected the State Department's
"suggestion of immunity" only upon a finding that the sovereign
never owned the property in the first place. Thus, these cases do not
substantially depart from the State Department policy; rather, they
merely represent specific exceptions to that policy.
III. REEVALUATION OF "IMMUNITY FROM EXECUTION"
It seems clear that denial of the right to execution of judgments
in their favor accords empty relief to private persons doing business
with foreign sovereigns" and, in light of the time and expense in-
volved in litigation, deprives them of the fruits of their efforts." The
argument that the conduct of diplomatic relations necessitates this
inequitable treatment is unrealistic since the "restrictive" application
of sovereign immunity is predicated upon the theory that sovereigns
engaged in commercial ventures must accept the obligations which
attach to such activity, and that, therefore, they should not be im-
mune from suit. This theory indicates that the business relationships
of sovereigns should be created and maintained on the basis of com-
mercial expertise, rather than on considerations of national dignity."
41
 348 U.S. 356 (1955).
42
 Id. at 364.
48 "[TJo refuse jurisdictional immunity only to subsequently allow immunity from
execution amounts to making the exercise of jurisdiction a purely nominal act . . . ."
Garcia-Mora, The Doctrine of Sovereign Immunity of Foreign States and Its Recent
Modifications, 42 Va. L. Rev. 335, 359 (1956). See also International Law—Sovereign
Immunity—Seizure of Property Under Restrictive Immunity Doctrine, 54 Mich. L. Rev.
1008 (1956); and Lauterpacht, The Problem of Jurisdictional Immunity of Foreign
States, 28 Brit. Y.B. Int'l L. 220 (1951).
44 Mann, State Contracts and International Arbitration, 42 Brit. Y.B. Intl L. 1,
30-31 (1967).
45 it is doubtful that this assumption applies to the Peoples Republic of China
since under its "system of state monopoly of foreign trade, the citizens of the [Peoples
Republic of China] are themselves denied the right to do private business with foreign
countries . . . ." Therefore, "as sole owner of all business corporations and productive
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Thus, enforcement of foreign sovereigns' commercial obligations by
American courts should not be a source of embarrassment to the
Executive branch in its conduct of foreign affairs. For these reasons,
it is submitted that the State Department's "jurisdiction-execution"
distinction should be reexamined and a new national policy formu-
lated which would effectuate the intent of the Tate Letter to protect the
rights of private American enterprise. Specifically, in actions instituted
by private parties against foreign governments arising from the private
or commercial activities of the latter, the State Department should
no longer mechanically recognize immunity of the sovereign's prop-
erty from execution in all situations.
This policy, which would serve to insure a just result in such
disputes, finds ample precedent in the law of many countries. In
Kingdom of Greece v. Julius Bar & Co.," an action was brought by
a Swiss bank to redeem a bond issued by the Greek government. The
Federal Tribunal of Switzerland rejected the claim that the foreign
sovereign's immunity from execution should be absolute. The Tri-
bunal reasoned that the presence of a foreign state before a Swiss
court to determine the rights and obligations of the foreign govern-
ment implicitly requires the execution of any judgment against that
sovereign:
If that were not so, the judgment would lack its most essen-
tial attribute, namely, that it will be executed even against
the will of the party against which it is rendered. It would
become a mere legal opinion. Moreover, while its effects
would be less directly felt than those of measures of execu-
tion, such an opinion would also affect the sovereignty of
the foreign State. If, therefore, measures of execution
against a foreign State were prohibited in order to safeguard
its sovereignty, logically the exercise of jurisdiction would
likewise have to be prohibited."
In Government of Peru v. S. A. Sociedad Industrial Financiers Ar-
gentina," the Argentine Supreme Court entered a judgment against
Peru on a debt owed to an industrial financial society. The court al-
lowed the execution of this judgment stating that:
In view of the fact that the plaintiff State voluntarily sub-
mitted to the jurisdiction of the Court in the original action,
it must be presumed that the State will also comply with
whatever proceedings are necessary for the performance of
the Court's decision, provided that said proceedings are
property, the state simply cannot treat foreign nationals on an equal footing . .
	 ."
Hsiao, Communist China's Trade Treaties and Agreements (1949-1964); 21 Vand. L.
Rev. 62.3, 645 (1968).
46
 [1956] I.L.R. 195 (Federal Tribunal, Switzerland),
47 Id. at 198-99.
48 26 I.L.R. 195 (Supreme Court, Argentina 1958).
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compatible with the norms and ,
 principles of international
law. Compliance with the judgment by the legal representa-
tive of the foreign State at his official residence in no way
constitutes an infringement of his privileges and immu-
nities; rather is it conducive to the realization of a just
settlement of the disputes between the parties."
There is a cautionary note in the Argentine Supreme Court's
decision that execution of a judgment against a foreign sovereign
must be "compatible with the norms and principles of international
law,"5° This indicates that denial of "immunity from execution" in
such disputes will not obtain in every case, but only where the dignity
of the sovereign is not threatened. For this reason, in the courts of
many countries, the nature of the property sought to be used in satis-
faction of a judgment is determinative of a foreign sovereign's right
to "immunity from execution.' If the property is in the sovereign's
possession by virtue of that government's character as a public au-
thority, then the property is immune. However, if the sovereign ac-
quires and maintains the property in the course of its commercial
activities, then it is not immune. In British Government and the Mu-
nicipality of Venice v. Guerrato, 52
 a wrongful death action was insti-
tuted in Venice against the British government. Judgment was entered
against the government and the plaintiff sought to execute that judg-
ment by an action to levy distress on a building in Venice owned by
Britain. The Ministry of Justice of Italy acknowledged its disfavor
with the practice of denying private litigants the right to satisfaction
of judgments against sovereigns, but declined to allow execution in
this case because the property was an integral part of Britain's gov-
ernmental function.
The Egyptian courts follow a similar policy, but allow "immu-
nity from execution" in one other situation—where the property
sought to be used to satisfy a judgment against a foreign government
is located in the sovereign's territory. In Egyptian Delta Rice Mills
Co. v. Comisaria General de Abastecimientos y Transportes de
Madrid,53 the plaintiff-company had contracted to sell rice to the
Spanish Comisaria General. A court order was subsequently obtained
directing the defendant to pay the overdue balance of the purchase
price. When the plaintiff sought to use the defendant's funds, located
in Egypt, to satisfy the order, the Commercial Tribunal of Alexandria
dismissed the defendant's plea of "immunity from execution" and
stated that:
40 rd .
150 Id.
51
 For a listing and discussion of the countries which follow this practice see, Re-
statement (Second) of Foreign Relations Law of the United States 69, Reporter's
Note 2 at 216-18 (1965).
52
 28 I.L.R. 156 (Tribunal of Venice, Italy 1959).
53 [19431 Ann. Dig. 103 (No. 27) (Commercial Tribunal of Alexandria, Egypt.
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As regards the execution of the judgments, although a
foreign State can claim immunity from execution this im-
munity applies only where the execution takes place on the
territory of that State or when the assets which it is pro-
posed to attack are held by the State in virtue of its char-
acter as a public authority. On the other hand, where, as in
the present case, the assets which are the object of the exe-
cution are on Egyptian territory and are in fact funds which
belong to the Comisaria General not as a public authority
but as the directing power over a group of undertakings,
all of a commercial character, the execution must be
authorized."
A policy similar to that of Egypt is well suited to meet the con-
flicting concerns of the United States Department of State regarding
disputes between private litigants and foreign sovereigns. As noted,
the conflict is that of protecting the litigant's rights, on the one hand,
versus "embarrassment to the executive arm of Government in con-
ducting foreign relations,"" on the other. The Egyptian policy cir-
cumvents this problem since it entitles the private party to recover
in all situations except those which would truly "embarrass" the
Executive.
IV. EFFECTING THE CHANGE
If a policy similar to that of Egypt is to be effected in the United
States, it will probably have to be introduced by the Executive since,
as noted, the Judiciary accords great weight to State Department
determinations in this area. However, this does not mean that the
courts are necessarily bound to perpetuate this practice. In the Tate
Letter, which formally introduced the Department's adoption of the
restrictive theory of sovereign immunity, it was recognized, in clear
and unmistakable language, that a "shift in policy by the executive
cannot control the courts."" Explicit in this statement is an admis-
sion that a jurisprudential shift by the courts cannot be controlled by
the Executive.
In fact, while there is little precedent in the area of sovereign
immunity for such judicial "initiative," some courts have refused to
abide by the State Department's "suggestion of immunity." United
States v. Harris and Co. Advertising, Inc.° 7
 is the first case in which
a court declined to follow the Department's suggestion that the
property of a foreign sovereign was immune from execution. In
Harris, the plaintiff-advertising company had recovered a judgment
against the Republic of Cuba and had levied execution on three
54 Id. at 104.
55
 Ex parte Republic of Peru, 318 U.S. 578, 588 (1943).
55
 See text at note 16 supra.
57 149 So. 2d 384 (Fla. 1963).
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Cuban airplanes located in Florida. Subsequent to the execution sale
of the planes, the State Department filed a "suggestion of immunity"
as to the proceeds from the sale. The Third District Court of Ap-
peals of Florida denied immunity since the plea was not timely. The
court further held that:
The pleas cannot reach the proceeds of the execution
sales because the proceeds of said sales are not the property
of the Republic of Cuba . . . but . . . of the judgment credi-
tor . . . . The attempted pleas coming after the expiration of
the power of the trial judge to interfere with the chattel of
a foreign nation, the reason for the doctrine of sovereign
immunity no longer existed and, therefore, there was no rea-
son to apply the doctrine." 58
As in Stephen and National City Bank, the Florida court limited its
decision to the facts of the case and did not make a sweeping attack
on the injustice of the State Department's policy of granting immu-
nity from execution to foreign sovereigns, even where immunity from
suit did not obtain. However, it is submitted that these decisions rep-
resent the embryonic stage of judicial discontent with the existing
inequities of the State Department policy, and should be regarded as a
premonitory sign of expanding judicial refusal to perpetuate that
policy. Where the property sought to be used in satisfaction of a
judgment against a foreign government is situated outside the sover-
eign's territory and is not related to its public functions, the American
courts could effectively overrule the State Department's position by
ignoring the Department's suggestion of immunity in disputes in-
volving the commercial activities of a foreign nation.
However, notwithstanding the courts' increasing willingness to
rectify the inequitable treatment accorded private persons doing busi-
ness with foreign governments, it is hoped that the State Department
will initiate the required policy change. This approach would avoid pos-
sible conflicts between the Executive and Judiciary and would lend
support to the principle that "[i]n our dealings with the outside
world, the United States speaks with one voice and acts as one. . . .""
It is further suggested that the strong possibility of in-depth
trade relations with the Peoples Republic of China presents an excel-
lent opportunity for introducing the desired change in our State De-
partment policy. Owing to inevitable international interest regarding
current developments in diplomatic and trade relations between the
United States and China, the State Department would be provided
an international forum for presenting the policy change to the nations
of the world. In addition, the suggested denial of immunity from
execution would offer a necessary protection to private American
enterprises in their dealings with Chinese corporations. The need for
58
 Id. at 385-86.
59 United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203, 242 (1942).
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such protection is based on the fact that Communist China owns and
operates all of the commercial activity within its territorial boundaries,
and its "system of state monopoly of foreign trade simply does not
permit private or nongovernmental transactions. . . ."" Consequently,
under existing State Department policy, private persons would never
be entitled to satisfy judgments secured against Chinese corporations.
Thus, prior to the commencement of extensive commercial dealings
with China, the Executive branch should put the world trading com-
munity on notice that those who enter the field of international com-
merce with this country enter on a par with private enterprise, subject
to the courts of this nation and to their processes.
CONCLUSION
The present United States policy regarding the perplexing prob-
lems posed by the doctrine of sovereign immunity is far from settled
and the potential for inequity to American litigants is great. While
the Tate Letter's restrictive application of that doctrine was intended
to protect the rights of such litigants and to hold foreign governments
to their commercial obligations, these aims are frustrated by the re-
fusal to enforce judgments levied against sovereigns. Placing trading
nations on a par with private enterprise would substantially resolve
the inconsistencies of the present policy and would adhere to the gen-
eral commercial policy of this country. The doctrinal basis for such
an approach was established in 1824 when Chief Justice Marshall
stated that:
It is, we think, a sound principle, that when a government
becomes a partner in any trading company, it divests itself,
so far as concerns the transactions of that company, of its
sovereign character, and takes that of a private citizen. In-
stead of communicating to the company its privileges and
its prerogatives, it descends to a level with those with whom
it associates itself, and takes the character which belongs to
its associates, and to the business which is to be transacted."
The principle seems no less sound that when a sovereign takes the
"character of a private citizen," its commercial obligations should be
enforceable in the courts of the United States.
RAYMOND M. RIPPLE
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